The End of Theories We Grew Up With
Message-driven explanations have ancient roots-for example, in the _ rhetoricians' search for linguistic forms that make arguments compelling. Their modern incarnation comes from journalism. Journalists see them selves as writing newspapers and magazines that were created to be mass produced and uniformly comprehensible to their readers. When new media such as radio and TV came along, and when interpersonal encoun ters, political events, and organizational processes came to be seen as communication as well, the printed message quickly became the domi nant metaphor for conceptualizing them. The fact that discrete messages were not so obviously, if at all, identifiable in these new media; that dif ferences in interpenmnal skills, accessability, and authority had no place in these explanations; and that definitions of community or of a public based on common exposure to messages became empirically untenable, did not prevent communication researchers from refining message-driven explanations.
In fact, Lasswell (1948) (Schramm, 1954 (Schramm, , 1955 . However, only Shannon's diagram and Weaver's popular commentary on the theory entered the bulk of communications literature. Although the theory extended our vocabulary-adding such terms as redundancy and the encoding and decoding of messages-Shannon's statistical and rela tivist measure of information quickly became equated with news, or the stuff that messages "objectively" contain. After these basic notions were in place, message-driven explanations mushroomed. Without reviewing the many and more increasingly sophisticated versions of message-driven explanations that developed from these early beginnings, let me simply suggest that they now permeate the examplars in our field: studies corre lating message variables and effects, inquiries into the effectiveness of different message designs, use of mathematical theories to predict atti tude changes from media exposure, and so forth. None of these regard the human participants in the progress as capable of making up their own meanings, negotiating relationships among themselves, and renecting on their own realities.
D<ji11i11g ,lfediu Studies
Where message-driven conceptions of communication entered serious empirical tests, they turned out to be of limited explanatory value. For ex ample, Katz and Lazarsfeld 0955) found evidence that led them to re place the hypodermic needle conception of mass media effects with a two-step flow model. The first step involved exposure to the media and the second an informal opinion-creating process mediated by opinion leaders. Klapper's (1960) massive review of the effects literature conclud ed that the mass media had rather limited abilities to shape their audience members' lives. I-Iis conclusions were criticized because (a) his review was sponsored by the networks who, being under public scrutiny, had an interest in its outcome; and (b) industry would not continue to finance the mass media through its advertising without reasonable expectations of a return on its investment. A more likely explanation for Klapper's findings is that message-driven conceptions just don't work. Obviously, the effects researchers, their reviewer Klapper, and his critics' responses to the mass media and to each other could hardly be explained in causal terms.
Faced with these apparent failures, scholars came up with new concep tions. In the beginning these conceptions appeared to be mere stopgap measures, designed to keep linear causal explanations in place. But they also provided the seeds for alternatives to the dominant accounting prac tices. Let me mention some of these.
One is the uses mu/ gratificaliolls approach. This approach can be traced to propagand.t effects studies during World War II and to Berel son's (1949) study of what missing the newspaper meant during a strike in New York City. Inquiries into the social and psychological needs, sources of expectations, and gratifications derived from mass media at tendance led proponents Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1974) to turn the message determinism the other way. How audience members used these messages was found to be far from uniformly distributed among audience members. There was no obvious message determinism of effects.
Another and far further going approach can be seen in the informa tion-seeking paradigm (e.g., Donohew & Tipton, 1973) . Here, "objective" contents of messages are largely irrelevant. Individuals are seen as active ly engaged in diverse information seeking, avoiding, and processing strategies, which turn out to be explainable in terms of their "image of re ality," their "goals, beliefs, and knowledge." Information no longer is ex plainable from the properties of message alone. Senders or producers no longer play the central role that message-driven explanations assigned to them.
In organizational communication research, a so-called i11terprelive "P proc � cb (e.g., Putnam & Pacanowski, 1983) has become increasingly ap pealing. It centers on the way individuals make sense of their world through communicative behaviors, and it attempts to explain choices in terms of prevailing "organizational cultures" or working climates to which members of an organization come to be committed. It holds that mea11-
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ings are created and negotiated, neither objectively given nor assignable by a scientific authority. Individual participation in a social network of in teraction, not the messages, become the explanatory basis of outcomes and effects.
Probably the most productive demonstration of the not so minimal ef fects of mass communication is the research on the media's ability to cre ate issues and set agendas for public opinion and action (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972) . Clearly, issues, agendas, and controversies exist neither outside language nor without political actors' understanding. They are part of the very public discourse within which mass media institutions and mass media audiences constitute themselves. Their reality resides in the playing of a public game of, albeit unequal, participation. One aspect of this unequal participation has been theorized as the so-called "spiral of silence" (Noelle-Neumann, 1984) , which adds to the setting of agendas participants' perception of each others' opinions on issues; it attempts to predict the emergence of certain political realities by processes analogous to self-fulfilling prophecies.
Sources of Breakdown and Alternatives
Actually, communication research is comparatively late in experiencing such breakdowns of message-driven explanations which, while still ram pant in public and everyday discourses, have been dismissed in other dis ciplines for different reasons.
The breakdown of the popular notion of language as descriptive or representative of an objective world external to us and separate from lan guage has been slow in coming, but it now enters the study of communi cation at numerous not so obvious entry points. It started with the Wittgensteinian notion of language as a game people play, was paralleled in the Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity, and has recently led to the search for more adequace accounts of meaning in terms of the coglli live schemas underlying the understanding of linguistic constructions (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987) . Here, the objectivism in message-driven explanations is quite explicitly and thoroughly discredited and replaced by an experientialist alternative.
Social constructivists have shown that Mfacts''-from emotions to per sons, gender, language, and cul!ural institutions-are socially construct ed, in the sense of having been invented, perhap'i at a time no longer ac cessible to individual memories (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) or from behind the facade of political institutions (Edelman, 1977) , now being ha bitually reproduced by its participants. Constructivi'its can be divided into three camps. The first maintains the belief in an observer-independent re ality relative to which constructions by the media and by ordinary people could be compared and verified. In the opinion research literature, Lipp man was an early proponent of this view. Boorstin O 964) still believes he Dl1i11i11g Media Studies can distinguish pseudo-events from real ones. Tuchman 0974) considers news as constructed by the way the mass media are organized, and Gitlin 0979) demonstrates how hegemonic processes account for TV entertain ment. Efforts to deconstruct social phenomena by showing how real so cial institutions, hegemonic forces, and power structures are responsible for them belong here as well. This approach-some call it trivial co11-stmctivism-is unable to take institutions, structures of domination, ide ologies, and so forth, including the reality referred to in explaining these phenomena, as the analysts' constructions.
The second group, the social co11struclio11ists, tie themselves to the later Wittgenstein and subsequent natural language philosophers by argu ing that all social phenomena can be explained by reference to language. Foucault (e.g., 1989 ) exemplifies a grand semiotic version of this view. Gergen (1985) , his collaborators, and several discourse analysts-few of which build on Foucault's work-have shown how persons, emotions, gender, (self-)identity, taboos, and so forth are constructed and negotiat ed in language. They see no need co refer to facts outside of language. From their perspective, th<.! mass media do not merely construct a public reality, they also construct themselves into it.
Finally, radical co11struclivists (Glasersfeld, 1991; Watzlawick, 1984) , joining hands with second-ordl!r cyberneticians (Foerster, 1974; Mead, 1968) and with biological cognitivists (Maturana & Varela, 1987) , go be yond language determinism by insisting that internal and external reality is omnipresent but 1101 l.mowable without constructive participation by its observers. This seriously challenges the claim of privileged access to real ity as a basis of scientific authority, questions the use of this metaphysics by scientists to justify their role as intellectually superior observers of less sophisticated others, and criticizes the failure of researchers to reflect on their own cognitive participation in the phenomena they claim to de scribe. It radically doubts anyone's ability to provide objective accounts of the meanings messages have for others and thereby removes the ground of message-driven explanations. Radiql constructivists also em brace an important demand of feminist theory (e.g., 13elenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) to treat knou 1 ledge not as abstract and freely transmittable, but as embodied in a kuowerwho supplies his or her own terms for understanding, embracing both intellectual and emotional expe riences. This me:ms that no knowledge can exist outside knowers and that all facts have their factors, their mak<.!rs. This constructivism is radical because its conceptual framework grants no epistemological exceptions to scientific observers, constructivists included.
Let me offer just one example of the kind of message-driven research whose unreflected claims I find increasingly offensive. Recently, I attend ed a workshop on the effects of tel<.!vision on children. A good part of it was devoted to childre11 · s 1111derstandi11g. Proceeding from commitments to message-driven explanations, the researcher exposed children to se lected TV images and tested for what they could recall and correctly iden-'/1Jt' Pt1s/ of Co1111111111iw/i1111 '.� J-Jr,pl!d-For Fut11re tify. The findings of these experiments were graphed and presented as showing how children's understanding improved with age. A construc tivist critic might ask how and whose understanding is being articulated here: Clearly, the commitment to me�sage-driven explanations was the researcher's, not the children's. What counted as messages (what the TV images depicted) was decided by the researcher, not by the children. And although children live, at least in my experience, in a very imaginative, fantastically rich, and certainly more varied world than adults do, the re searcher allowed as data only what he could cast into the categories of his own operationalized understanding. The children's did not matter. The researcher observed no more than how well children's (unobserved) understanding conformed to his well articulated expectations of what children should sec or do if they were more like him and less like the children they were. He acted as the self-appointed agent of an objective, shared, and adult world in which and to which children are expected to adjust, and explored no more than his own preco11ceptio11s, using chil dren, much as they are used in society-as convenient props. Message driven studies obviously disrespect others' understanding. The claim to have studied children's understanding is not sustainable in the face of the apparent intellectual imperialism.
One alternative to the above is the anthropologist Wagner's 0981) con ception of culture. In the minds of objectivists, culture usually ends up being a causal agent of overwhelming power. For Wagner it becomes the anthropologists' way of explaining their encounters wiJh people other than their own. Respecting, yet not grasping, the emergence of otherness in conversation, feeling the loss of certainties that everyday communica tion does afford, experiencing breakdown in the taken-for-grantedness of common sense, leads the analyst to invent and the interlocutors to co construct something both can live with. For reflexive anthropologists, this entails reinve11ti11g tbeir own culture. Applied to the research example, Wagner might suggest listening to the children's stories with wonder and trying to make sense of why they tell us, if they do, what they see in terms of our understanding of their understanding of us. In such a reflex ive loop, we might learn at le�st to appreciate children's ways of seeing. We might also come to understand something about our own understand ing of, for instance, how constrained we have allowed ourselves to be come.
In the above, I see a new convergence of natural language philosophy, ethnography and cognitivism in linguistics, social and radical construc tivism, second-order cybernetics, reflexive sociology, and the above men tioned responses to the failures of message-driven explanations (not just in mass communication), to which one might add efforts to understand the new interactive media (computer interfaces, hyper-media, virtual real ity) that have so far defied traditional theorizing. The epistemology of this new constructivism calls into question whether we could have communi cated the way we said we did.
Defi11i11g Media Studies
Consider the rather sketchy history of communication research, its fail ings and the emergence of alternative paths, that I constructed as a st01y. It began with familiar but simple-minded accounts of how messages drive humans into compliance. But in its unfolding it is obvious that this simple beginning contradicts tbe ve,y experience of constructing, commzmicat ing, and listening to (or reading) it. Here, our story confronts its own re ality, which resides in its present telling. It suggests that the reality we sought to approximate by our scientific accounts always was of our own making, and it now calls on us to bring into focus the very communica tion practices we use in inquiring and writing about communication.
To me, this realization marks a bifurcation point for communication re search. I don't anticipate that message-driven communication research will disappear. People in positions of authority are all too eager to em brace deterministic reality constructions that can offer them the prospect of forcing predictability and controllability onto others. Witness the use of message-driven vocabulary in the mass media, politics, education, adver tising, public relations, and management. Communication researchers can withdraw into this comfortable niche where message-driven explanations are enforced and the handmaidens of manipulatory interests are reward ed. This would surely be the end of our story.
Becoming aware of the reality in telling our story of communication is a way of getting out of the trap of message-driven explanations. But it also means accepting the notion that reality is a social invention. Surely, we could not otherwise explain the experience that Reality Jsn 'I Wbat It Used to Be (Anderson, 1990 ) and how our constructions of communication could be evolving, as they do, in the very process of inquiring and com municating about them. The revolution that this new understanding of re ality can set in motion could be of a Copernican magnitude. However, while Copernicus's theory challenged only the location of the center of the then known astronomical universe and left the hierarchical organiza tion of social and religious life and the objectivist construction of the uni verse pretty much intact, the epistemology of this new constructivism challenges the privileged role of disembodied knowledge and reveals its complicity in the emergence of hierarchical forms of social and political authority and its attendant requirement of submission.
Constructability of and in a Virtuous Future
I am suggesting that the strands of scholarship mentioned above could be woven into a radically new and virtuous syntbesis, seeing humans first �1s cognitively autonomous beings; second, as reflexive practitioners of com munication with others (and this includes social scientists in the process of their inquiries); and third, as morally responsible interveners in, if not creacors of, the very social realities in which they end up living. To em brace this new epistemology, let me end this essay by suggesting that communication scholars recognize the social constructibility of reality, with all of its consequences, and make commitments on each of these three points.
First, the commitment to respect th� cognitive autonomy of those ob served and theorized. This presupposes the recognition that language, communication, indeed all social pbe11omena exist only in the knowledge their participants have of them. Specifically, there can be no scientific or everyday understanding of human communication without an under standing of the understanding of those involved in communication. Story tellers can attest to this. Scientists know it when writing for their peers. I am merely suggesting that we grant those we seek to theorize like abili ties of understanding. In contrast, message-driven explanations equate scientists' understanding with objective truth and therefore cannot re spect others' understanding of communication, unless they all agree. Nor can they acknowledge that anyone's understanding of communication is reflexively embedded in communicating about it. Cognitive autonomy re sides in the (my) fact that (a) individuals cannot be forced or caused to understand something as intended, as it exist'>, or as it should be; (b) that nobody can directly observe someone else's understanding; (c) that all in dividual actions are dedicated to preserve individual understanding, and (d) that understanding is never final, even in the absence of external stim ulation.
Respecting this autonomy prevents abstract and disembodied commu11icatio11 theory constructions and encourages explanations of communi cation phenomena (and of other social constructions) from the bottom up, from the knowledge and practices embodied in its participants. This contrasts with top-down explanations that attribute determining forces to someone else's (usually the observing scientists') super-individual con structions-for example, ideologies, hegemonic forces, cultural deter minisms, rules, or objective meanings. Respecting this autonomy also means abandoning the idea of creating general tbeories without obtai11-i11g, as far as possible, tbe co11se111 of those tbeorized. If people do hold different theories of communication and practice them with each other, a general theory of communication may not do justice to either. Indeed, there are plenty of eminently practical folk theories people live by-for instance, communication as imparting knowledge, as maintaining or cre ating relationships, as domination or control, as healing wounds, as dance, and so forth. For inquiries in communication, I prefer a conversa tion metaphor because it respects the cognitive autonomy of others (Krip pendorff, in press, a).
Second, communication scholars should commit themselves to reflexive tbeo1J' co11struclio11s by means of which they can enter others' under standing into their own understanding. As understanding is never fin ished, this means that a reflexive reality cannot remain fixed either. It is continually created, tried out and tested each time it is being talked about. This is so for social scientists, whose analytical categories, origi-nally invented for mere analytical purposes, can become real (Giddens, 1991, pp. 40-41) ; for politicians, whose campaign promises can change political practices; for engineers, whose inventions keep technology on the move; and so it is in the everyday life of communication. All social theories must also be communicable , at least among scientific peers, and may reach and affect those theorized therein. Neither can they escape the self-reference this entails, nor can their stability be assured in being com municated. Denying the reflexive nature of human communication (theo ry) sets communication researchers apart from their subjects and creates reality constructions that aid technologies and can support oppressive so cial structures. Reflexivity is perhaps the most outstanding feature of human communication. I have proposed (Krippendorff, in press, b) that human communication scholarship redefine itself in terms of the dis course that embraces itself.
Third , we need a commitment to what one might call a distributive ethics for social inquiry. In the preceding, I claimed that knowledge, es pecially social scientific knowledge-communication theory, for exam ple-can hardly be prevented from entering the phenomena it addresses. Whether it is intended to be critical or merely descriptive, it can delegit imize what exists or contribute new social constructions. The changes thus brought forth encourage the emergence of radically distributed reali ties , a multi verse of reflexive constructions, that no general theory can capture. I believe that the increased awareness of our role in the socially (and hence communicationally) constructed, distributed, and emerging nature of contemporary realities has brought us, as social scientists, to a point where truth is secondary to the responsibilities we bear for our con structions. To be consistent with this new multiverse means to distribute this responsibility. I made the methodological proposal to invite those af fected to participate in the construction of communication theories con cerning them (Krippendorff, in press, a) . Living such an ethics may not be easy. However, practical difficulties should not deter us from developing methodologies that assure respect for those theorized.
No story of our message-driven past can tell us what the future has in store. But its present telling demonstrates the constructed nature of our field , and the awareness of this demonstration affirms our role in invent ing and reconstructing the social realities we work in. If this is so, we might as well take the poetic licence to construct, and put into a story, the most desirable realities we can imagine. Understanding this understand ing could be a moment of liberation.
